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FRIEDRICHS: AN UNEXPECTED TOOL FOR 
LABOR  
Heather M. Whitney* 
Forthcoming in N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty (Supreme Court Review) 
 
Today, about half of U.S. states allow unions and public-
sector employers to privately negotiate for agency shop arrange-
ments. Under such an arrangement, employees in a bargaining unit 
who choose to not join the union (and thus do not pay membership 
dues) are required to pay a fee to the union that covers their share of 
the costs the union bears as their collective bargaining representa-
tive.1 Union cannot avoid these costs. As is the case under the NLRA 
for private-sector unions, states require an exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative regime. That is, if workers want to guarantee that their 
employer will sit down and bargain with their representative, those 
workers must ensure that their chosen representative is not just cho-
sen by them but supported by a majority of workers in their bargain-
ing unit – a bargaining unit they do not get to choose for themselves.2 
Once their representative is chosen by a majority in that unit, the rep-
resentative is then the exclusive representative for all the unit mem-
bers, even those who do not want that representative bargaining on 
their behalf. Because the union represents all members of the bar-
gaining unit, the law also requires the union to represent all members 
equally. The union cannot, for instance, bargain for a raise for union 
 
* Bigelow Fellow & Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. The author 
wishes to thank Will Baude, Genevieve Lakier, and Laura Weinrib.  
1 See, e.g., Jurupa Unified School District and National Education Association – Jurupa, 
Collective Bargaining Agreement at section 6 (July 1, 2014) (Membership/Service Fees pro-
vision) (the CBA at issue in Friedrichs).  
2 For public teachers in California this is mandated under the Education Employment 
Relation Act. Under the Act, public school teachers have the right to “form, join, and partic-
ipate in the activities of employee organizations of their choosing for the purpose of repre-
sentation on all matters of employer-employee relations.” Cal. Gov’t Code s. 3543(a). Exclu-
sive representation is required under s. 3544-3544.9.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2687276 
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members only. If the union extracts additional benefits from the em-
ployer on behalf of workers, both union members and non-members 
must share in those gains equally.3 
As a result of government-imposed exclusive representation 
and fair representation requirements, the government has created its 
own free rider problem. Once the union has been elected, a worker 
knows she will get any benefits the union can provide without ever 
having to join, and thus pay membership dues to, that union. Agency 
fees (also known as “fair share” fees) are intended to combat this 
problem. By requiring non-members of the bargaining unit to pay 
their share of the costs, some free riding is avoided.  
Despite the importance of agency fees to avoiding the prob-
lem of the free rider, this Court may soon find that the agency fee 
system violates the First Amendment rights of the workers required 
to pay them. The Supreme Court previously considered and rejected 
this argument in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. There, the 
Court held that requiring non-members to pay the union for the costs 
it incurred for collective bargaining and contract administration did 
not violate the First Amendment, though requiring non-members to 
pay for the union’s political activities would. In Friedrichs v. Cali-
fornia Teachers Association, the Court will squarely address whether 
it should overturn Abood. The argument is that the distinction Abood 
drew between political and non-political union speech is an impossi-
ble one, as all union speech in the public-sector context is political 
and thus all compelled funding is unconstitutional.  The Court will 
also decide whether an opt-in system of dues payments is constitu-
tionally required. Betting on what the Court will do is a dangerous 
game but it seems likely, given language in other recent cases, that 
Abood will be overturned and public-sector employers will no longer 
be free to negotiate agency shop arrangements with their workers’ 
unions.4 
There are a lot of issues that have to be dealt with in Frie-
drichs – why and when compelled funding compelled speech and 
 
3 This includes arbitration over statutory rights. See Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 
247, 271 (2009) (finding duty extended to arbitrating age discrimination claims under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) when the collective bargaining 
agreement required arbitration of those claims).  
4 See Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 
(2012); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (refusing to apply Abood to “quasi” public 
sector workers and thus finding the agency shop arrangement to violate the First Amend-
ment).  
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whether the fact that the government is acting as an employer will 
come to bear on the Court’s First Amendment analysis being just two 
of them. These are important questions that many scholars will cover 
in the lead-up to this case. I will not add to the pile. Instead, here I 
want to think about this case from a different perspective. That is, if 
the Court does overturn Abood, what does that mean for unions and 
the future of labor more generally. There are three questions I want to 
focus on: first, does the government-created free rider problem, 
where unions are now required to provide free services to non-
members, create a takings issue? I think under current precedent the 
answer is no. Second, if it violates the First Amendment to require 
non-members to pay agency fees, does the entire exclusive bargain-
ing regime and corresponding duty of fair representation violate the 
First Amendment rights of unions? I think there are reasons to believe 
it does. And last, what effect will Friedrichs and its progeny have on 
the future of labor organization? Here I suggest that while it is possi-
ble these cases will “kill” labor, there is another story that is possible 
and indeed supported by history and current events: a backlash 
against union repression resulting in the mobilization of labor. No 
longer finding the NLRA and state-equivalent bargain worth the 
price, workers may decide it better to fight outside that system. Be-
low I take each of these questions in turn.  
TAKINGS FROM UNIONS  
Does requiring the union to provide services to non-paying 
non-members constitute a taking, at least when doing so requires the 
union to expend money? If you take the position that “all regulations, 
all taxes, and all modifications of liability rules [should be under-
stood as] takings of private property prima facie compensable by the 
state” the answer is easy: yes.5 Conversely, if you are an originalist 
and believe the Takings Clause was narrowly meant to require com-
pensation when the government exercises its power of eminent do-
main – that is, when the government physically seized property – the 
answer is also easy: no.6 But if what we are asking is whether there is 
a colorable argument that requiring exclusive representation that non-
 
5 Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 
(1985).  
6 For this view see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Tak-
ings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 840 (1995).   
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members do not have to pay for constitutes a takings given current 
case law, the answer is complicated. The Court’s takings jurispru-
dence is a conceptual mess.7 Given that, while there are some cases 
that support such a conclusion, those cases stand on unstable concep-
tual grounds.8   
That the prohibition on agency fees could constitute a taking 
when combined with the duty of fair representation appears to have 
been first suggested by Chief Judge Wood, in her dissent in Sweeney 
v. Pence.9 There, the Seventh Circuit had to decide whether Indiana’s 
“right to work” law was preempted by federal labor legislation and, 
even if it was not preempted, whether it violated the First Amend-
ment rights of unions.10 As Chief Judge Wood saw it, the duty of fair 
representation in conjunction with the Indiana statute, which prohib-
ited the employer and union from negotiating any contract that re-
quired non-members to pay money to the union to cover their share 
of the costs,11 meant the state took the union’s money by requiring 
the union to expend money to provide services to non-members. 
Judge Wood found this scheme to look like the one struck down in 
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.12 There, a state required 
interest income that was generated by clients’ funds held in lawyers’ 
trust accounts to be transferred from the account to a foundation that 
provided legal services to the poor. The Court held in Brown that the 
interest was the property of the clients and if the government was go-
ing to require it to be transferred from the account to the foundation, 
that action had to be justified under the Takings Clause.13 Brown in-
volved the government explicitly required a transfer of money from 
one private party to another while the Indiana statute required unions 
to provide services but was agnostic about which money (if any) had 
to be spent to provide them, that distinction was thought irrelevant for 
purposes of a takings analysis by both the majority and dissent. For 
its part, the majority found that to the extent there was a taking, the 
 
7 For a small sampling of criticism to this effect see XXXX.  
8 This is a change from my prior position. See, e.g., Heather Whitney, “When does la-
bor law violate the Takings Clause,” PrawfsBlawg (July 2, 2015); Heather Whitney, “Guest 
Post: The Takings Clause and Sweeney v. Pence,” OnLabor (Sept. 4, 2014).  
9 Full disclosure: I clerked for Chief Judge Wood.  
10 Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014).  
11 See Ind. Code § 22-6-6.  
12 538 U.S. 216 (2003).  
13 See 538 U.S. at 235.  
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union was justly compensated for it through its continued exclusive 
bargaining representative power.14 
While the majority’s response is unconvincing,15 there is an-
other difficulty with finding a taking and it happens at the threshold. 
What private property does the government take when it requires a 
private party to provide services to another?16 In this case, it appears 
to be the money a particular union would have to spend to provide 
the requisite services. But the argument that whenever the govern-
ment requires someone to provide a benefit to another the Takings 
Clause applies was rejected by a majority of the Justices in Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). There, a statute enacted in 
1992 required companies that used to be in coal mining business to 
contribute to a fund providing for the health-related expenses of re-
tired miners and their families. The statute required Eastern Enter-
prises to pay for such benefits for miners it employed between 1946 
and 1965, even though it never agreed to provide those benefits in the 
original collective bargaining agreements. The expected liability cre-
ated by the statute was between $50 and $100 million. While the par-
ties did not raise the issue, nor did the Justices at oral arguments, the 
Justices were split on whether the Coal Act took any property within 
 
14 Sweeney at 21.   
15 For one, this argument looks much like the one rejected in Loretto. There the Court 
said that “a landlord’s ability to rent his property may not be conditioned on his forfeiting the 
right to compensation for a physical occupation.” 458 U.S. at 439 n. 17. The Court went on 
to say that such an argument “would allow the government to require a landlord to devote a 
substantial portion of his building to vending and washing machines, with all profits to be 
retained by the owners of these services and with no compensation for the deprivation of 
space. It would even allow the government to requisition a certain number of apartments as 
permanent government offices.” Id. The majority’s argument is similar. A union could avoid 
the requirement by ceasing to be the bargaining representative of the workers who exercised 
their federal and state rights to be represented by one just as a landlord could refuse the re-
quirement by ceasing to be a landlord, but being a landlord and being a bargaining repre-
sentative may not be so conditioned. See id. at 439 n. 17. Moreover, as the Court most re-
cently reaffirmed in Horne, its “cases have set forth a clear and administrable rule for just 
compensation: ‘The Court has repeatedly held that just compensation normally is to be 
measured by ‘the market value of the property at the time of the taking.’” Horne at 16 (citing 
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (quoting Olson v. United States, 
292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)). The compensation is the market value of the property (here, 
money) the government took, not a hazy theory that the mandated exclusive representation 
regime is a form of compensation for another mandate the union did had little choice but to 
accept.  
16 As scholars have noted, this threshold requirement is too often assumed. See Thomas 
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Virginia L. Rev. at 891 n.20 (collect-
ing scholarship criticizing the Court and scholars for overlooking this question). It is an as-
sumption I have been guilty of in prior writings on this topic. See supra note 8.  
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the meaning of the Takings Clause at all. In total five justices found 
that it did not.17 As Justice Kennedy put it, “[t]he law simply imposes 
an obligation to perform an act, the payment of benefits. The statute 
is indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply or the 
property it uses to do so … To call this sort of governmental action a 
taking as a matter of constitutional interpretation is both imprecise 
and … unwise.”18 Indeed, the Court had previously rejected the ar-
gument that a takings occurs “whenever legislation requires one per-
son to use his or her assets for the benefit of another.”19  
While the line between a taking and regulation is already “dif-
ficult to discern or to maintain,” extending the regulatory takings 
doctrine to situations like this one, where the duty merely requires the 
union to perform a service, and where no specific property right or 
interest is at stake, arguably takes what is already “one of the most 
difficult and litigated areas of the law” and makes it more so.20 This 
is not to say that the requirement that unions provide free services to 
non-members is not a burden, but if the line between takings on one 
side and permissible taxes and regulations on the other is to be main-
tained, finding a takings is more trouble than it is worth.  
 
COMPELLED SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION BY UNIONS  
The next question worth considering in a post-Friedrichs 
world is whether, if compelling non-members to pay agency fees to 
public sector unions violates the First Amendment, union’s First 
Amendment rights are infringed by both the exclusive bargaining re-
gime and corresponding duty of fair representation.  
If the Court overturns Abood, it will likely do so by rejecting 
the distinction Abood made between a union’s non-political and polit-
ical speech and instead find all public sector union speech to be polit-
 
17 While there were five votes to find the Act unconstitutional, four did so as a takings 
and the fifth vote, by Justice Kennedy, found the act a violation of substantive due process 
while expressly finding the Act did not take property within the meaning of the Takings 
Clause.  
18 Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 540.  
19 Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 555-556 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (quoting Connoll v. 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)).  
20 Id. at 540; 542.  
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ical.21 Once collective bargaining-related speech is considered politi-
cal, requiring unions to engage in that speech on behalf of non-
members (by imposing on them the duty of exclusive representation) 
should also be considered compelled political speech and compelled 
expressive association. The same is true of the requirement that they 
provide services to non-members (the duty of fair representation).  
 Start with the duty of fair representation. As mentioned previously, 
the duty arises from the union’s role as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative and requires the union to represent all employees within 
the unit “without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in 
good faith.”22 The duty applies at all stages of collective bargaining, 
from negotiations to contract enforcement. Between requiring the un-
ion to represent and bargain on behalf of non-members, prohibiting it 
to favor its own members, and requiring equal treatment through con-
tract enforcement, the law compels unions to speak and negotiate 
with certain individuals. Post-Friedrichs that is compelled political 
speech and association.23   
To overcome this infringement on the union’s First Amend-
ment rights, other scholars have argued that the government must 
demonstrate that it has a “compelling interest in requiring unions to 
negotiate and grieve their nonmembers’ complaints without receiving 
 
21 Of course, the Court could go the other way. That is, it could take the position that 
compelled funding raises no First Amendment issues at all, even with the union speaking 
politically. Like in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 
(2006), the Court could find that agency fees do not involve compelled speech because the 
non-members are not required to say anything and remain “free … to express whatever 
views they may have on the [union’s collective bargaining activities].” Id. at 60. Or the 
Court could find the compelled funding “ancillary to a more comprehensive program re-
stricting [labor relations] autonomy” and thus acceptable. See United States v. United Foods, 
533 U.S. 405, 406 (2001) (distinguishing Glickman, where mandatory assessments to pro-
mote tree fruit were upheld against a First Amendment challenge). I do not mean to suggest 
the Court could not come to such a conclusion. However, here I mean to imagine a post-
Friedrichs world where plaintiffs win.  
22 Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (under the Railway Labor 
Act). The duty was extended to unions operating under the auspices of the National Labor 
Relations Act in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman. California mandated the duty via statute. See 
e.g., California Educational Employment Relations Act, Government Code section 3544.9; 
Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act section 3578. California adopted the 
federal test for determining whether a union violated the duty of fair representation in 
Romero v. Rocklin Teachers Association (1980). A union violates this duty if it acts in an 
“arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith” manner. See Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 
(1967). 
23 Indeed, Harris, where the Court held that the agency fee arrangement for quasi public 
sector workers violated the First Amendment already found that bargaining is political 
speech in the public-sector context.  See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).  
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just compensation and that this duty [is] narrowly tailored to effectu-
ate that interest.”24 But that is the wrong question for two reasons. 
First, whether the union is reimbursed for the compelled speech and 
association the government requires it to take on may be relevant to 
whether the system exacts as taking from the union but is irrelevant 
to whether the government has a compelling interest in compelling 
that speech and association in the first instance. We do not think the 
problem in Barnette, where school children were unconstitutionally 
compelled to salute the American flag, was that the government re-
quired that salute without paying the students, nor do we think the 
problem would have been different if payment were involved; the is-
sue was whether the government had a compelling interest in compel-
ling the students to salute. In the exclusive representation context, the 
government compels the union to speak on behalf of non-members 
and to speak for them equally as much as the union speaks for its own 
members. Post-Friedrichs, this set up compels the union to speak and 
associate politically. Thus, in order to overcome the First Amend-
ment challenge, the government must demonstrate a compelling in-
terest in requiring that exclusive representation regime.  
One might stop here and argue that the government does not 
compel an exclusive bargaining regime. The union could instead op-
erate a “members only” union, and indeed the language of the statute 
at issue in Friedrichs suggests the availability of that option.25 How-
ever, that option is not in fact available to the union. In order for pub-
lic sector workers to exercise their right to have their employer sit 
down and negotiate with the representative of their choosing, that 
representative is required under California law to be the exclusive 
representative of that workers’ bargaining unit. 26 The same is true 
under the NLRA. While the plain language of section 7 guarantees 
covered employees “the right to … bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing,” the Board has held that employ-
ers are not required to bargain with member-only labor organiza-
tions.27 Thus, in order for workers to guarantee their ability to bargain 
 
24 Fiske at 462.  
25 See Cal. Gov’t Code s. 3543.1(a) (“Employee organizations shall have the right to 
represent their members in their employment relations with public school employers”).  
26 See Cal. Gov’t Code s. 3543.   
27 See Dick’s Sporting Goods  Case 6-CA-34821 (June 22, 2006) (NLRB General 
Counsel refused to issue a complaint against employer who declined to recognize and bar-
gain with member-only union, finding “the employer in these circumstances had no obliga-
tion to recognize and bargain with the Council. This principle is well-settled and not an open 
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through representatives of their own choosing, that representative 
must represent all members of that worker’s bargaining unit. In the 
same way a non-member of the bargaining unit is “forced” to pay 
agency fees (or find another job), the members and union are 
“forced” to associate with and speak with non-members (or lose their 
statutory right to negotiate through the representative of their choos-
ing). As long as the former constitutes an unconstitutional condi-
tion,28 so too should the latter; their First Amendment challenges 
should rise and fall together.29  
The question we are now left with is whether the government, 
in 2016, can demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring an exclu-
sive representative regime. The Court has previously recognized “that 
a single employee [is] helpless in dealing with an employer; that he 
[is] dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of 
himself and family; that, if the employer refused to pay him the wag-
es that he thought fair, he [is] nevertheless unable to leave the employ 
and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union[s] [are] essential 
to give laborers [the] opportunity to deal on an equality with their 
employer.”30 This is the reality for a large share of workers and as the 
Court has said, Congress “[is] not required to ignore” the need for 
collective action given this reality, and can thus “safeguard it.”31 Let 
us then assume that the government has a compelling interest in regu-
lating the employer-employee relationship in light of the risk of arbi-
trary and unfair treatment of the much less powerful workers at the 
hands of employers. Promoting and safeguarding worker collective 
action is a reasonable way to approach it, but we are still left with 
 
issue … the statutory obligation to bargain is fundamentally grounded on the principle of 
majority rule.”). See also Charleston Nursing Center (finding employer did not interfere 
with employees’ section 7 right to bargain collectively when it refused to meet with a group 
of workers).  
28 And recall in the context of the NLRA, the Court has found the right of employees to 
self-organize and select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or 
other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer a “fundamental 
right.” See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).  
29 Another parallel worth drawing is between the First Amendment rights giving to cor-
porations and unions. If one believes states cannot condition access to incorporation on the 
waiver of First Amendment rights, then one should also believe states cannot condition the 
right to negotiate collectively through a chosen representative on the waiver of First 
Amendment rights. While there are interesting arguments for why the state should be able to 
condition access to the corporate form in this way but assume for purposes of this article that 
the current Supreme Court does not take that position.  
30 Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937). 
31 Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937). 
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whether an exclusive bargaining regime is sufficiently tailored to 
promote that interest. And here the argument becomes more difficult. 
The government does not require unionization. The default is non-
unionization and the government’s stated aim is to ensure employees 
having the free choice to unionize or not.32 Why, if workers choose to 
unionize, must they unionize under an exclusive bargaining regime? 
It is understandable why the state of California prefers exclusive rep-
resentation based on majority rule – dealing with a single representa-
tive for all workers may be easier than dealing with many.33 But, 
first, in the absence of unionization, public-sector employers are in 
the much more burdensome position of negotiating individually with 
each employee. And second, convenience is no response to whether 
exclusive representation is properly tailored to the government’s le-
gitimate interest. The government and labor scholars must accept the 
challenge of justifying the imposition of exclusive representation 
where, post-Friedrichs, it compels political speech and association. I 
am doubtful it can be done.  
 Instead of scholars defending the government’s compelling 
interest in having an exclusive bargaining regime, some scholars 
have argued for members-only (also known as minority) unions.34 At 
least one has argued that the NLRA can be read to allow for member 
only unions today.35 In my own work I have highlighted how workers 
have worked together to extract gains totally outside the exclusive 
representation regime.36 While it may be that in a world without ex-
clusive representation workers need additional protections when 
striking, picketing, and engaging in secondary boycotts, all of those 
protections could be given without compelling union and non-
members political speech and association.  
 
 
 
32 XXXX 
33 See San Mateo, 663 P.2d at 531. 
34 Though they have only argued for this in right to work states and do not suggest it re-
place the exclusive bargaining regime elsewhere. See Catherine Fisk and Benjamin I. Sachs, 
Restoring Equity in Right to Work, 4 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 859 (2014).  
35 See Charles Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the 
American Workplace (2005).  
36 See Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on Employer-Labor Organization Co-
operation, X Cardozo L. Rev. x (2016).  
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MOBILIZATION OF LABOR 
So far I have raised and speculated about potential post-
Friedrichs First and Fifth Amendment issues. I want to end by specu-
lating about the social and political implications of not just overturn-
ing Abood but of overturning it in an environment where NLRA-style 
unionization is already difficult to achieve and an increasingly unat-
tractive option for those interested in furthering the interests of work-
ers.37 Here I suggest that while the dominant story is that Friedrichs 
and its progeny are killing off unions, that story may be wrong. There 
is instead an alternative story and it is one of worker and union back-
lash against courts and business interests they perceive as attacking 
them.38 On this story, Friedrichs and its progeny have unintentionally 
created a focal point – a rallying cry – around which workers and un-
ions can mobilize, radicalize, and develop creative and powerful al-
ternatives to New Deal-type unionization. Indeed, we may be in the 
early days of that backlash now.     
In her Harris dissent, Justice Kagan rightly pointed out that 
where the law compels the union to represent members and non-
members equally while also prohibiting agency fee arrangements, it 
is in the economic self-interest of both those who support and oppose 
the union to withhold payment.39 However, while Justice Kagan 
seemed to worry that the absence of short-term economic self-interest 
would result in the financial ruin of unions, we know that is not the 
case. Today, 25 states already have right to work laws and in those 
states we have not seen unions fall into financial peril.40 Instead the 
enactment of right to work laws appears to result in a small drop in 
union membership.41 But given that paying the union in right to work 
 
37 Many scholars, myself included, have documented the Board and court-created diffi-
culties modern unions face. See Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on Employer-
Labor Organization Cooperation, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. __ (2016), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2663593. 
38 Backlash against Court decisions has been documented previously. See Michael J. 
Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. American Histo-
ry 81 (1994).  
39 See Harris at 22 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
40 See Scott Cohn, “An American workplace war that’s reached a tipping point,” CNBC 
(May 29, 2015).  
41 Here I am referring to drops in membership among bargaining units already orga-
nized prior to the enactment of the right to work law. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from 
2000 to 2014 suggests that in right to work states union membership stabilizes at around 84 
percent of represented workers. In contrast, states with agency fees over the same 14-year 
period saw approximately 93 percent of represented workers as full union members. See Bu-
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jurisdictions can be understood as financially irrational, what might 
explain worker support? Justice Kagan thought altruism or loyalty the 
only available alternative explanations,42 but there are others. Unions 
are among the types of private associations that make up a vibrant 
civil society and make available to individuals a community and 
sense of identity. Joining and supporting a union can be an important 
social and political act, particularly in the wake of court decisions 
that are perceived as an attempt to kill unions. Worker solidarity and 
mutual aid, upon which unions are founded, are after all political and 
social ideals.43 And, while it is too early to say, it may well be that as 
the Court exacerbates the free rider problem unions face, unions will 
look to stoke within workers the embers of a solidarity ethos that 
were neglected so long as access to member money did not require 
activation of such class consciousness.44 Group solidarity is in turn an 
important precondition for the creation of social movement organiza-
tion, like labor organizations, and social movement activism more 
generally.45 
Public sector union’s preemptive response to Friedrichs sug-
gests such stoking has begun. Not intending to sit passively by and 
await their demise, the possible elimination of agency fees has mobi-
lized the organizations. The president of AFSCME said in a recent 
interview that agency fee arrangements had made the teachers’ union 
complacent. “I think we took things for granted. We stopped com-
municating with people, because we didn’t feel like we needed to. 
That was the wrong approach, and we don’t want to fall back in to 
that trap.”46 In anticipation of Friedrichs the union has taken steps to 
remedy that error, creating a more engaged membership – a member-
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ship that feels invested in and solidarity with the union and its leader-
ship.47 Other union leaders have expressed similar sentiments.48  
Workers and union mobilization in response to a judiciary it 
thinks illegitimate would not be a historical anomaly. In the early 
twentieth century, something similar happened and labor went out-
side the formal channels of politics and litigation and instead acted 
directly, through mass protests, strikes, and boycotts.49 Today, we see 
workers doing something not dissimilar, though admittedly so far on 
a much smaller scale. Recognizing that the benefits of massive gov-
ernment regulation is no longer worth the costs, workers are develop-
ing non-traditional forms of worker organizations that entirely bypass 
the NLRA and its state equivalents. Fight for $15, a movement 
backed heavily by the SEIU to raise the minimum wage for fast food 
workers to $15 an hour, is one particularly successful version of this. 
The Immokalee Workers, who work to better conditions of tomato 
pickers in Florida by targeting reputation-sensitive companies like 
Taco Bell and national grocery stores at the top of the food supply 
chain (instead of their direct employers) are another.50 For these non-
traditional organizations, Friedrichs does nothing to slow their mo-
mentum.   
In short, while Friedrichs may well overturn Abood and with 
it a compromise that has lasted for decades, between the First 
Amendment arguments it makes available to unions and the backlash 
that is already brewing in response to it and the conditions in which 
workers currently find themselves, I suspect the case will ultimately 
be to the good of workers and their organizations.   
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